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 Since the 1960s, nonprofit organizations, particularly those established as interest and 
citizen groups arising from disaffection with government, have increasingly engaged public 
policy making processes to advance their causes (Berry, 1999; Berry & Arons, 2005). However, 
our understanding of how nonprofit organizations do this generally remains separated in two 
distinct literatures.  The literature on nonprofit organizations engaged in policy advocacy tends to 
focus on the organizations themselves, documenting what kinds of organizations engage policy 
processes and what enables them to do so (Casey, 2011; Child, & Gronbjerg, 2007; Mellinger & 
Kolomer, 2013; Mosley, 2010; Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008) as well as why they form and how 
they are maintained (Walker 1983).  Often using survey methods, this research has examined 
nonprofits’ roles in the policy process (Mosley, 2013), what tactics they employ (Mosley, 2011), 
and what makes them effective (Hoefer, 2000; Hoefer, 2005; Hoefer & Ferguson, 2007; Leech, 
Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, & Kimbal, 2007). 
Public policy theory and research, on the other hand, tend to focus on the processes of 
policy change, the situations that facilitate change, and the distribution of power among policy 
players. For example, collaboration among private and public actors in policy subsystems for 
strategic action is explored by policy network theory (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003); the broader 
political context and how coordinated groups take advantage of opportunities and respond to 
constraints to advance their beliefs is the focus of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier, 
1988); and how power is distributed and negotiated by government officials and power brokers is 
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variously considered by theories of pluralism (Dahl, 1967), group theories (e.g., Baumgartner & 
Leech, 1998), elitism (Putnam, 1976), and iron triangles (Ripley & Franklin, 1984). These 
theories and others in policy studies clearly have strategic implications for nonprofit 
organisations seeking to influence the policy process. 
What is lacking is an understanding of how nonprofits view the processes of policy 
change, and to what extent they resonate with major policy theories.  As Almong-Bar and 
Schmid (2013) note, “Strikingly, there are very few studies that have examined the advocacy 
activities of [nonprofit human service organizations] in relation to policy-making processes that 
use public policy-making theories or building on knowledge from policy studies” (p. 27).  
Examining how nonprofits attempt to affect policy change and connecting their activities and 
desired outcomes to policy studies theory is one way this divide can be bridged.   
Policy advocacy strategies are comprehensive, long range approaches to policy change, 
while tactics are the specific advocacy activities employed within the strategies (Ganz, 2009; 
Berry, 1977).  By examining the tactics nonprofit organizations combine into distinct policy 
advocacy strategies, we can link those strategies to policy theories that support their actions.  In 
doing so, we can better understand how nonprofit organizations view the processes of policy 
change.  The significance of this understanding is two-fold.  For the policy advocacy 
organizations, it provides theoretical grounding for their strategies.  Policy advocacy tends to be 
informed by wisdom literature and anecdotes, and little theoretical guidance or empirical 
evidence is available for strategic decision making.  But articulated linkages between advocacy 
strategies and established policy theories can provide that guidance.  For the policy studies 
community, it begins to bridge the gap between studies of advocacy organizations and theories 
of policy change, by identifying the policy processes in which those organizations engage. 
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This paper uses Q-methodology to identify these strategies and to surface the subjective 
understanding of policy advocates about policy processes.    Q-methodology is an established 
approach to systematically analyze patterns of subjectivity on topics of study.  It combines semi-
structured interviews with a structured exercise that guides respondents to sort statements of 
opinion along a scale of agreement.  It then uses factor analysis to identify underlying structures 
of viewpoints revealed from structured surveys. 
Tactics and strategies of policy advocacy 
Nonprofit organizations have developed a number of reports with logic models that 
suggest a variety of tactics for policy advocacy.  Among them are those published by Action Aid 
(Chapman & Wameyo, 2001), The Annie E. Casey Foundation (Reisman, Gienapp, & 
Stachowiak, 2007), The Center for Community Health and Evaluation (n.d.), Grantmakers in 
Health (2005), Harvard Family Research Project (Coffman, 2007), and Innovation Network 
(Morariu et al., 2009). These logic models describe organizations’ approaches to the policy 
advocacy process using three main elements: inputs, activities, and outcomes. The types of 
activities and outcomes identified in these practitioner logic models are summarized in Table 1. 
While instructive, this literature has largely been based on practice wisdom, rather than informed 
by policy studies theory or empirical research on non-profit advocacy. 
Studies that have surveyed nonprofit organizations on their policy advocacy have used 
various approaches to delineate a list of advocacy activities.  Common categories are associated 
with the targets of advocacy, such as administrative advocacy, legislative advocacy, and media 
advocacy (Hopkins, 1992).  Advocacy has also been characterized by the actions it entails, such 
as research and public education, coalition building and direct actions (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 
2013), developing consensus among experts, pursuing issues in court and aiding in the election 
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of particular candidates (Hoefer, 2000, 2001).  Walker (1991) took a broader view of advocacy 
approaches by looking at how organizations may use multiple activities as part of an overall 
“pathway to influence” (p. 103).  He argued that activities tended to fall into two categories: an 
‘inside’ strategy that seeks to build close ties with public officials and an ‘outside’ strategy that 
aims to influence and mobilize the general public. Following Walker, Mosley (2011) uses the 
classifications of insider and direct for those tactics that involved lobbying or engaging with the 
government through giving testimony or participating in commissions, while classifying as 
indirect those tactics that primarily focused on changing the climate around policy advocacy, 
such as coalitions or public education campaigns.   
Few studies have explicitly linked advocacy outcomes with their intended outcomes.  
Schmid, Bar and Nirel (2008) used three categories of activities with implied outcomes in their 
study: 1) those intended to protect the rights of special populations, educate the public and 
achieve social goals; 2) those directed at influencing figures in the government or media; and 3) 
those attempting to gain access to decision makers in order to promote the organization’s 
advocacy goals.  Gen and Wright (2013) drew on practitioner literature and policy theory to 
hypothesize connections among policy advocacy activities that might lead to certain outcomes, 
with routes to policy change envisioned through influencing decision makers, indirect pressure 
on decision makers through public engagement, direct changes through litigation or pilots, 
shaping implementation of policy rather than its passage, and a strategy that focused on making 
the policy process more democratic and people-centered, rather than changing a specific policy.  
Explicitly connecting policy activities and outcomes with policy studies theory can lead to 
greater understanding of what tactics and strategies may be most successful for particular ends.  
Walker (1991) noted that interest group literature tends to be mostly case study driven, with 
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different classification schemes and emphases that make generalization and theory-building 
difficult.     
Linkages among the activities and outcomes described by practitioners are supported by a 
variety of policy studies theories that suggest certain activities or forms of influence may lead to 
particular types of outcomes. See Table 1 for theories that support connections among certain 
advocacy activities and the outcomes/impact to which they might lead.  These theories are now 
described in brief, to lay out the potential linkages between policy advocacy activities and 
outcomes that are tested in this study. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Theories linking policy activities and outcomes 
Theories on coalitions, issue networks, and interest groups suggest a link between 
building support among potential allies and the general population and changing public opinion 
to indirectly pressure decision makers for policy adoption.  The advocacy coalition framework 
recognizes that organizations with shared interests can form coalitions that facilitate learning and 
collective action on policy issues (Sabatier, 1988).  Resource mobilization theory suggests that 
advocates can gain patrons for their cause through use of tactics associated with public 
mobilization and the media: protests and social change activities can attract the interest 
and sympathies of potential adherents and media work can boost the visibility of such 
activities (McCarthy & Zald, 2006).  Interest group studies examine how organizational 
characteristics translate into their influence on policy (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998), such as the 
ability to coordinate communication and engage and mobilize the public (Cahn, 1995).  Olson’s 
(1965) theory of latent groups cautions that the potential power of large groups is ineffective or 
latent unless individuals are induced to act.  Taken together, this body of work suggests that 
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coalition building can make groups and organizations more powerful in driving policy change 
collectively than they would be on their own, in part by demonstrating the level of interest in 
their issue to decision makers. Information campaigning among organizations and with the 
public can change policy preferences.  Mobilizing and engaging the public in various ways like 
voting, protesting, or rallying demonstrates their will to decision makers.  These influences on 
decision makers can ultimately spur their action to initiate policy change. 
Institutionalism and elite theory suggest a path to policy change by directly influencing 
decision makers’ views.  Lobbyists with resources and political influence nevertheless face a 
major challenge in overcoming political bias toward the status quo, but when policy shifts it can 
do so dramatically and provide a major payoff for a sustained lobbying campaign (Baumgartner 
et al., 2009).  Institutionalism views formal government players in the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches as well as government agencies as holding the power of policy change.  
Activities to build relationships with policy makers and lobby them on preferred policy 
directions evoke institutionalism (Cahn, 1995).  Elite theory suggests that political power is 
actually held by a small segment of the upper social class with fairly uniform policy preferences 
that is aware and intentional about perpetuating its privileges (Mills, 1956; Putnam, 1976).  
Advocates can influence their views as an interim step to the elite exercising power over policy 
makers, though elite theory suggests that this group more often sways public opinion to follow 
their own (Edelman, 1964; Herman & Chomsky, 2002).  
The power of information and rhetorical framing to influence both the public and 
decision makers in setting the policy agenda and building political will for action is highlighted 
by rational decision-making, rhetoric studies and media studies.  Rationalism is the underlying 
reason that advocacy organizations, particularly think tanks, produce research and analysis of 
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policy issues to educate policy makers directly or influence them indirectly by informing the 
public (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979; Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980).  Empirical research has suggested 
a more limited role of research in policy influence, with the theories of incrementalism 
(Lindblom, 1959) and bounded rationality and satisficing (Simon, 1945) underscoring the 
suboptimal role of research in policy development and adoption. Presenting information in 
manner favorable to particular policy preferences, known as framing, is another tactic to 
influence the perspectives of decision makers or the public.  This is often done through the use of 
anecdotes that highlight contexts, stakeholders and values related to policy issues (Nowlin, 
2011).  While an overarching theory is lacking, studies in the rhetoric literature have found that 
framing can be effective for gaining policy support (Schneider and Ingram, 1993).  Using the 
mass media as a means of disseminating messages has also been found to be effective for 
building public awareness and support for advocates’ policy preferences (Nowlin, 2011), as well 
as propelling social issues on to a policy agenda (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), or raising the urgency 
of an issue for political action (Linsky, 1988).  Engaging in public discourse and debate as a 
means of defensive actions to counter opponents’ arguments is another strategy suggesting the 
importance of information and framing to influence decision makers, the general public, and 
organizations within policy subsystems.  Defensive activities assume a pluralistic democracy in 
which policy influence is held by multiple competing factions (Dahl, 1967). 
Attempting to influence policy through pilots, attention to implementation processes or 
litigation through the courts are less orthodox strategies that nonetheless have support in policy 
studies theories and scholarship. Incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959) recognizes that policy is 
often made through low-risk, low-impact decisions that gradually shift a policy direction rather 
than comprehensive rational decision making.  Advocates can make strategic use of 
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incrementalism by demonstrating efficacy of a potential policy approach through small-scale 
pilots when comprehensive reform is politically infeasible. Advocacy focused on implementation 
rather than policy passage has an implicit bottom-up view that bureaucrats have significant 
discretion to interpret and apply policies (Hill & Hupe, 2011). This stage of the policy process 
can also provide an opportunity to evaluate whether adopted policies are achieving their goals 
(Nachimas, 1980).  Monitoring policy implementation offers advocates an opportunity to 
influence the policy agenda: either to keep an issue off the policy agenda and maintain the status 
quo or put an issue back on the policy agenda to enable reform.  Advocates may use litigation as 
a strategy when they perceive that they do not have influence with the executive or legislative 
branch.  The theory of adversarial legalism (Kagan, 1991; Kagan, 1999) identifies the formal 
legal contestation as a process for invoking legal rights, duties and procedural requirements 
related to policy.  This advocacy strategy can fit organizations with resources such as staff 
attorneys, emphases such as discrimination or good governance, and goals to challenge 
ideological opponents and earn media coverage of their issue (Epstein, Kobylka & Stewart, 
1995). Kagan (1991) cautions that adversarial legalism has drawbacks as well as benefits: while 
the courts can enable the politically weak to demand their rights from the government, as in the 
case of the civil rights movement, the unpredictable and costly nature of litigation makes this a 
potentially risky strategy.  Group mobilization of the law, when people or organizations come 
together to form class action lawsuits, can spread risk and work together with other strategies, 
such as when a group of organizations form a coalition to file an amicus brief with the courts 
(Wasby, 1983). 
Moving backward from policy outcomes to the activities that may impact upon them, 
multiple streams theory and studies on public participation suggest activities for advocates 
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interested in influencing the policy agenda or promoting a more democratic policy making 
environment.  Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams theory notes that policy change can happen 
when three streams of activity converge: a problem stream with information about a social 
problem, a policy stream about how to address the social problem, and a political stream in 
which the political climate or public mood favors action on the social problem.  Each of these 
streams have implications for potential advocacy activities to influence the policy agenda: 
information campaigning to build awareness of the problem in the problem stream, research to 
support potential policy directions in the policy stream, and lobbying decision makers to build 
political will and/or engaging the public through information campaigning and mobilization in 
the political stream.  Studies of public participation in the policy making process suggest that 
engaging the public can also contribute to broader outcomes about policy making in a democratic 
environment, including legitimizing the policy process by enabling broader public input and 
earning great public support (Bryson & Anderson, 2000; Smith & Huntsman, 1997; Xu, 2001) as 
well as producing more effective policy (Kastens & Newig, 2008) with better distribution of 
benefits to stakeholders (Gallagher & Jackson, 2008). 
Taken together, these theoretical linkages between policy advocates’ activities and 
expected outcomes provide a menu of hypothesized tactics to empirically examine.  This paper 
seeks to identify patterns of shared understandings among nonprofit organizations about 
groupings of tactics that constitute overarching advocacy strategies, and how those strategies are 
supported by policy theories.  Specifically, it addresses the research question: What are distinct 
strategies employed by policy advocacy organizations?  The answers to this question reveal these 
organizations’ viewpoints on policy making processes and how they overlap with policy 




 To address this research question, Q-methodology was employed with interviews of 31 
individuals who manage their respective organizations’ policy advocacy efforts.  Q-methodology 
is a “…systematic and rigorously quantitative means for examining human subjectivity” 
(McKeown & Thomas, 1988, p. 7).1  It employs factor analysis to identify underlying structures 
of viewpoints collected from structured surveys.  However, its application of factor analysis is 
opposite that typically found in survey research.  In the typical R-method that is dominant in 
social sciences, the variables being analyzed are statements in a survey, while the cases are the 
respondents.2  The resulting factors are clusters of statements that reveal underlying meanings 
among them.  In contrast, factor analysis in Q-methodology treats the statements as the cases and 
                                                        
1 Q-methodology’s development is credited to British psychologist and physicist William 
Stevenson in the mid-1930s (Brown, Durning, & Selden, 1999; Watts & Stenner, 2012).  Since 
then, it has been widely applied to varied fields including human development, medicine, 
healthcare, policy analysis, education, social work, journalism, and communications.  In its first 
fifty years, over 1,500 publications employed the method and a journal dedicated to the method 
was established (McKeown & Thomas, 1988, p. 11).  Operant Subjectivity: The International 
Journal of Q Methodology is now in its 38th volume.  Even so, McKeown and Thomas 
characterized Q-methodology in 1988 as holding “fugitive status” within social sciences (p. 11), 
and Watts and Stenner described it in 2012 as “underused” (p. 18).  For this reason, we provide 
an extended description of the method and its application to this study. 
2 Watts and Stenner (2012) credit William Stevenson with labelling the foundational factor 




the respondents as variables.  Respondents rank the relative importance of the statements based 
on their internal point of view, and the resulting factors are clusters of respondents with related 
viewpoints on the phenomenon represented by the statements.  Watts and Stenner (2012) 
succinctly label Q-methodology a “by-person” factor analysis, in contrast to the more common 
“by-variable” (or by-statement) factor analysis of R-methodology (pp. 10-13).   
 Because Q-methodology identifies underlying viewpoints of its subjects, Brown (1980) 
concluded that it is “…pertinent to the study of public opinion and attitudes, groups, roles… 
[and] virtually all areas of concern to the social and political sciences” (p. 58).  Applied to this 
study, the statements are opinions of advocacy activities and their resulting outcomes, and 
respondents sorted them by their relative importance to their organizations.  The resulting factors 
identify unique viewpoints of nonprofit organizations on the processes of policy change and how 
they seek to influence those processes.  Our interpretation of these factors compare them to 
existing theories in policy studies. 
 Practitioners’ professional discussions on policy advocacy, or their “concourse” in the 
language of Q-methodology (Stenner & Watts, 2012, p. 34), are most formally represented by 
the logic models of policy change that have been published by them (Chapman & Wameyo, 
2001; Reisman, Gienapp, & Stachowiak, 2007; the Center for Community Health and 
Evaluation, n.d.; Grantmakers in Health, 2005; Coffman, 2007; and Morariu et al., 2009).  While 
these logic models identify the major categories of advocacy activities and outcomes, reflected in 
Table 1, most are not specific about the linkages between individual activities and outcomes.  
However, as discussed in the previous section, the policy studies literature suggests certain 
connections.  Drawing on these theoretical linkages between activities and outcomes, 24 
statements about policy advocacy tactics were developed, constituting this study’s Q-sample.  
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(Table 4, in the next section, lists these statements.)  These are individual statements of opinion 
on policy advocacy linkages, which respondents sorted onto a bell-shaped distribution ranging 
from -3 (least agree with organization’s approach to policy advocacy) to +3 (most agree with 
organization’s approach to advocacy).  By analyzing how respondents sorted these statements of 
opinion on policy advocacy, distinct viewpoints on policy advocacy strategies were identified. 
 The sample of nonprofits recruited for this study were systematically and purposively 
selected.  First, Guidestar was used to identify the population of nonprofits in San Francisco, 
Sacramento, and Washington DC3, that self-identified themselves in their IRS filings with NTEE 
prefix code R (advocacy) or suffix code 01 (advocacy in a specific prefix area) 4.  Of course, 
these filters would exclude many organizations that engage in policy advocacy, but they would 
certainly capture those that engage in advocacy as a primary activity, and would therefore be 
expected to provide well-articulated approaches to policy advocacy in the interviews.  Still, these 
                                                        
3 The national capital, a state capital, and a major city were deliberately selected to capture 
organizations advocating at different levels of government.  It was discovered, however, that 
organizations’ locations did not reliably predict the levels of government in which they 
advocated, so the final sample focused primarily on San Francisco organizations for logistical 
reasons, while ensuring that all levels of government were represented by the respondents.  Still, 
a few organizations from Sacramento and Washington DC were included. 
4 The National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) is a classification system for nonprofit 
organizations developed by the National Center for Charitable Statistics and used by the IRS.  
Nonprofits filing their revenues with the IRS self-identify their primary classification from a list 




NTEE codes do not distinguish between case advocates and cause advocates.  Case advocates 
represent and assist clients to access resources and services, with the aim of improving the 
clients’ welfare.  Cause advocates, on the other hand, represent groups and their interests to 
affect policy processes and social systems and conditions (Kirst-Ashman & Hull, 2008).  While 
it is not unusual for an organization to do both kinds of advocacy, this study is interested in the 
latter because they more likely engage in policy advocacy.  Therefore, as a final screen for the 
sample, Internet searches of the organizations were conducted to decipher whether they engage 
in policy advocacy, and if so, the levels of government they engage.  From the resulting set, we 
purposively sampled organizations to capture wide variance among major issue areas (self-
identified from their NTEE codes), levels of government, and reported expenditures.   
 We hypothesized at least five distinct advocacy strategies, based upon an earlier analysis 
of advocacy organizations’ logic models for policy advocacy  (Gen & Wright, 2013), so we  
targeted at least 20 organizations for our sample, to meet the recommended minimum for 
extracting five factors in Q-methodology (Watts & Stenner, 2012, p. 197).  Table 2 summarizes 
key characteristics of the final 31 participating organizations.  While 31 respondents would be 
inadequate in R-methodology’s application of factor analysis, it is ample for Q-methodology.  
Five or six respondents significantly loading onto each factor usually produces “highly reliable 
factor scores” (Brown, 1980, p. 67) that identify generalizable viewpoints.   
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
For each organization, we identified the staff member who managed the organization’s 
policy advocacy efforts.  For smaller organizations, this was often the executive director.  In 
larger organizations, it was often a policy director.  A member of the research team met with 
each respondent, and conducted a semi-structured interview followed by the Q-sort exercise.  
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Each interview covered the organization’s policy issues; its advocacy resources, activities, and 
outcomes; and a case of policy advocacy that represents the organization’s approach.  The 
researcher then facilitated the Q-sort, asking the respondent to review the 24 statements, then—
in a sequence of structured steps—sort them onto the rating scale.  
The resulting Q-sort data were analyzed using PQMethod software, applying centroid 
factor analysis with varimax rotation, to identify distinct viewpoints on policy advocacy, and to 
identify the organizations that most significantly associate with each viewpoint.  The resulting 
factors were each interpreted following the process prescribed by Watts and Stenner (2012, p. 
147-167) that converges both the statistical and interview data.  The factors identified the 
organizations with common viewpoints, and those organizations’ interview data pertaining to 
their advocacy activities and outcomes were incorporated to better understand the quantitative 
results. 
Findings 
 The factor analysis was conducted four times, to extract four, five, six, and seven factors 
from the data.  These extractions were compared by the cumulative variances they explained, the 
numbers of different organizations loading onto each factor, the numbers of confounding sorts 
(i.e., organizations that load onto more than one factor), and the numbers of non-significant sorts 
(i.e., organizations that do not load onto any factor).  The six-factor extraction was the most 
efficient in that it loaded the most organizations onto the fewest factors.  It explained 61% of the 
variance in the data while loading at least five organizations onto each factor, and accounting for 
all but one organization, at the 95% level of confidence.  Table 3 summarizes the organizations 
significantly loading onto each of the six factors.  Note that a few of the significant loadings are 
negative, meaning that the organizations are negatively related to those factors.  In practical 
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terms, this means the organizations significantly disagree with the strategies represented by those 
factors.  Positive loadings, on the other hand, mean the organizations are positively related the 
factor and significantly agree with the strategies represented by those factors.  These loadings 
can be interpreted like correlation coefficients, in that the closer the loading is to 1.0000, the 
stronger the relationship between the organization’s strategy and the factor.  A careful 
examination of Table 3 reveals that few loadings are greater than 0.7, and only one reaches 0.8.  
Thus, no organization’s strategy is perfectly represented by any of the factors.  Instead, an 
organization’s strategy might overlap with a factor or two.  That is, the factors represent 
commonalities in the strategies among the organizations, but each organization might employ 
more than one strategy in their advocacy campaigns.  For these reasons, the interview data were 
reviewed to find the parts of each organization’s strategies that overlap with its factor, in order to 
describe and explain the factor.    
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 Table 4 summarizes the resulting Q-sort arrays for the six factors.  Each array reports 
how the 24 Q-sample statements are sorted in the factor, on the same scale of -3 to +3.  
Interpretation of these arrays were guided by the “crib sheet” procedure prescribed by Watts and 
Stenner (2012).  This process systematically focuses attention on not only the lowest and highest 
rated statements in each array, but also those statements with ratings that are lower or higher in 
one factor than in any other, no matter the absolute value of the rating.  Doing so highlights the 
relative differences between the factors. 
 The rest of this section presents the interpretations of these six factor arrays and the 
policy advocacy strategies they represent, in order of the factors’ eigenvalues, from largest to 
17 
 
smallest.5  Each interpretation begins with a summary of its key statistics, followed by a 
description of the advocacy strategy based upon the statement ratings in the array.  In these 
descriptions, statement numbers and their ratings are referenced parenthetically (e.g., 11:+2 
means statement 11 has a rating of +2 in the factor array).  Schematic pathways (a through h) are 
also included in these descriptions, to graphically summarize the causal relationships assumed in 
each factor.  Finally, interview data are reported to further describe and explain each 
strategy/factor. 
Public lobbying strategy (Factor 1) 
 The public lobbying strategy had an eigenvalue of 7.12 and explained 11% of the 
variance in the Q-sorts.  Four of the 31 participating organizations were significantly associated 
with this strategy at the 99% confidence level, and an addition three were significantly associated 
at the 95% confidence level.   
 Nonprofits employing this strategy view themselves as champions of public interest 
issues and engage the policy process in order to affect broad improvements in physical and social 
conditions (08:+3) and to make the policy process more responsive to public interests (11:+2, 
12:0, 24:+2).  They accomplish these goals by lobbying policy makers (02:+3) –which may be 
legislators or government administrators—as they see these policy makers as the key to policy 
change (22:+2).  Their approach is less confrontational than others (03:-2, 05:-2, 17:-3), 
preferring the development of long-term relationships with policy makers.  Also, although they 
charge themselves to promote public interests, those interests are generally determined by 
                                                        
5 An eigenvalue is the sum of squared factor loadings, a measure of the variance explained 
by the factor.  The eigenvalue of 1.00 is generally accepted as the threshold above which 
factors are deemed reliable and worthy of interpretation, because the factor would explain 
more variance than a single Q-sort would on its own (Watts & Stenner, 2005).  In this study, 
each factor had at least five Q-sorts loading significantly. 
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themselves, not through direct community engagement (14:-2).  Indeed, influencing the public’s 
views is not a part of the strategy (09:-1, 18:-3).   
(a)  Policy advocacy  democracy, people-centered policies, effective policies 
(b)  Lobbying  policy makers’ views  policy change  social/physical conditions 
 The seven organizations in this study that were significantly related to this strategy 
advocate in a broad range of policy issues, including child welfare, juvenile justice, power 
supply, open lands, and performing arts.  Their commonality is their view that the public in 
general benefits from favorable policy changes in these areas, even though the public is not well 
informed or mobilized in these areas.  So their jobs are to advocate on behalf of the public’s 
interests.  As one executive director explained, “Consumers can’t tell on their own what’s good” 
in policies on power supply, so instead, “The grassroots depend on us to have expertise on the 
policy.”  His organization “...fights against regulation in the corporate interest, and fights for 
regulations in the public interest.  That is the framework that guides our work.”  Another director 
working in land conservation described her organization as a trustee of national land, working to 
keep the land accessible for public use and enjoyment.  Still another explained that his 
organization works “...on behalf of our conviction that the performing arts are an essential public 
good, critical to a healthy and truly democratic society.”  In all these examples, the advocates 
have a strong sense of responsibility to act on behalf of the public’s interest, even if not directly 
engaging the public. 
 These advocates’ approach to lobbying are generally collegial, rather than adversarial.   
Key to their efforts are building “one-on-one” relationships with policy makers, and providing 
them with credible research and information.  One policy director described her job as a 
“teacher” of legislators on her area of expertise, so she works hard to build and maintain the 
19 
 
rapport in those relationships. Another described with pride her organization’s reputation and 
relationships with city staff and council members, and how these relationships allow her to 
advocate for children’s programming.  A third policy director explained clearly the rationale 
behind these collegial relations when he said, “We [advocates] have a tradition of going up to the 
building and screaming, but we need a different approach if we want to get inside the building 
and have a meeting... You have to translate the urgency that makes you want to be loud and 
scream, and translate this into persistence and diplomacy.”   
 One variation of this strategy that was popular among the seven related organizations is 
the use of existing public support to complement the lobbying efforts.  This is subtly different 
than other strategies’ use of public pressure to sway policy makers’ decisions.  Instead, public 
mobilization in this strategy is to provide decision makers with cover for their existing stances.  
The advocate for open lands described this as an “insider’s game” in which he provided 
legislators not only with technical research to justify a policy, but also the public support to make 
the policy politically helpful for the legislators.  Another variation is the target of the lobbying.  
While much of the lobbying targets legislators, this strategy is also applied to administrative 
processes.  An advocacy organization in juvenile justice issues directs much of its efforts on the 
juvenile detention facilities, and how they implement policy.  Another focused on the regulatory 
body overseeing power supply, to change administrative procedures rather than legislative 
statutes. 
Inside/outside strategy (Factor 2) 
 This inside/outside strategy had an eigenvalue of 3.12 and explained 12% of the variance 
in the Q-sorts.  Six of the 31 participating organizations were significantly associated with this 
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strategy at the 99% confidence level, and an addition one was significantly associated at the 95% 
confidence level.     
 This strategy is distinguished by its two-prong approach to advocacy.  In the primary one, 
organizations indirectly influence decision makers by applying public pressure through 
information campaigns and media work (01:+3, 06:+3+, 05:+1).  This constitutes the “outside” 
component of the strategy.  In the other prong, organizations nurture relationships with one or a 
few influential issue champions from within the decision making body such as the legislature or 
an executive office (02:+2), helping those insiders sway their peers with information and shows 
of public support (10:+2).  Together, these two tactics lead to their ultimate objective, which is 
favorable policy change (16:+2):  
(c)  (Information campaigns, media work, rebuttals) + (lobbying, coalitions)  policy makers’ 
views  policy change 
While the strategy does employ pressure from the public, it is pragmatic in that its objectives are 
clearly focused on specific policy outcomes, rather than broader ideals of democracy (11:-3, 12:-
2, 21:-2).  Indeed, the political view of this strategy recognizes the power in legislative and 
administrative processes and chooses to work within that power structure rather than to bypass it 
through direct reforms (17:-3, 13:-2).  For example, a children’s advocacy organization sought a 
major reform in a state’s financing of public schools.  They had long developed the proposed 
reform, and had positioned themselves as the primary “outside” advocate in the issue.  In that 
role, they gathered and analyzed data, synthesized relevant research, and developed and 
disseminated arguments for their proposed policy change.  As its executive director described, 
they became “ground zero on all information and communications” on the issue.  When the state 
elected a new governor sympathetic to their cause, they targeted the governor as their inside 
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champion and lobbied for his support.  “Successful campaigns need lots of folks,” explained the 
executive director, “but you need a champion on the inside and outside.”  With the election of 
the new governor, the advocacy organization saw an opportunity for the “policy window” (the 
executive director’s own words) to open for this issue if they could secure the governor’s efforts.   
 While the outside champion in the above example was the policy advocacy organization 
itself, sometimes the advocates will organize a broader outside champion, such as the public or a 
coalition of groups.  In one case an advocacy organization fought for stricter standards on car 
emissions, which would encourage the further development of alternative fuels.  Their effort was 
heavily opposed and outspent by representatives of major oil companies.  Rather than standing 
alone to face that opposition, the advocacy organization built a coalition of organizations and 
garnered broad public support through their research and media work.  The policy director 
explained that it can be helpful to have a “big bad opponent” that lacks a positive public image.  
It makes it easier to “generate a lot more public interest and support.” 
 The inside champion, however, is usually a specific individual or small group of 
individuals within the decision making body.  The strategy is deliberate in focusing on a few 
inside individuals to sway their peers, rather than directly lobbying the entire decision making 
body.  It assumes that the inside champions have a better understanding of the competing 
interests of their peers, so they are in a better position than the advocacy organization to 
negotiate for support.  As one advocacy director put it, they don’t broadly lobby the legislature 
because “we want to get things done!”  Their efforts in lobbying would be futile compared to 
those of an inside champion. 
 Key to this strategy is the information campaign that is often used to mobilize public 
support and apply pressure on decision makers.  Many of these organizations have in-house 
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researchers who collect and synthesize information on their issues, and some have staff trained in 
media and public relations.  The research can be original or others’, but in this strategy the policy 
preferences must be substantiated by empirical evidence in order to garner support from the 
public and editorial boards, and provide support to the inside champion.  To translate such 
evidence to the public, these policy advocates develop messages and frame the issues in ways 
with broad appeal.   One policy director said her job is to “dewonkify” complex problems and 
solutions to messages that anyone can understand.  In her case, her organization sought the 
adoption of a 15 mph speed limit around all schools in her city.  While the issue had conflicting 
perspectives from law enforcement, traffic engineers, neighbors, parents, and drivers, she 
recognized that everyone could sympathize with the perspective of the pedestrian student, so she 
framed the issue from that perspective and used the media to build support for the proposal. 
Direct reform strategy (Factor 3)  
 The direct reform strategy had an eigenvalue of 2.95 and explained 11% of the variance 
in Q-sorts.  Three of the 31 cases were significantly associated with this strategy at the 99% 
confidence level, and another four were associated at the 95% confidence level.   
 In this strategy advocates bypass legislative processes to directly influence policy change 
through judicial (17:+3) or administrative (07:+1) processes.  They supplement these efforts with 
information campaigns aimed at building general awareness and support for their causes (06:+2, 
16:+2, 20:+2).  Even so, their aim is not a more democratic or responsive system (12:-3, 18:-2, 
21:-2), nor is it to mobilize the public or create coalitions around their causes (10:-2, 14:-3).  
Instead, this strategy focuses on specific policy changes to improve social or physical conditions 
of their represented interests (08:+3).    
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(d)  (litigation, monitoring) + information campaign  policy change  social/physical 
conditions 
 Oftentimes, advocates using this strategy are litigants using the judicial system to seek 
policy relief for those they represent.  One advocate called this “impact litigation,” the pursuit of 
policy change through the court system for large numbers of people, such as through class action 
lawsuits.  Of course, this approach to direct reform requires specialized training in the legal 
system.  The sizes and the sophistication of these organizations vary widely in our data, but the 
basic components of this strategy are common among them.  For example, on one extreme, a 
one-person nonprofit organization—who is an attorney—sought a ban on a specific ingredient 
popular in processed and prepared foods.  He sued a major food processor, and later a major fast-
food chain, for their use of the ingredient, claiming adverse health effects, even death, for those 
consuming their food.  Within days of filing his suit, he earned local media coverage by a 
newspaper, and within a few weeks he was on major national media outlets.  The intense public 
attention on the issue was enough for the food processor to propose to settle the case out of court.  
They offered to remove the ingredient from their products, in exchange for dropping the case 
without prejudice.  The US Food and Drug Administration also responded to the public scrutiny 
by proposing and eventually adopting regulations requiring the labelling of the ingredient in all 
food products.   
 On the other extreme, another case was championed by an established nonprofit 
organization with 24 employees, including attorneys, researchers, and public relations staff.  This 
organization is engaged in ongoing efforts to tighten regulations on, and eventually close down, 
coal-fired power plants in the U.S.  They represent plaintiffs in lawsuits against specific power 
plants across the U.S.  In a typical suit, they challenge the government permits issued to the 
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plant, demanding further restrictions on emissions.  Research they compile or produce are key 
parts of these suits.  Local public awareness is also, so they build local coalitions to drum up 
support for their suits.  To them, the research and public awareness is part of the strategy, to put 
public pressure on the defendants.  As the founder of the nonprofit explained, “Litigation, policy 
analysis, and media outreach” are the key activities of their advocacy campaigns.  They work 
together to place pressure on the judicial process for policy change.   
 Other advocates using this strategy engage administrative processes or direct community 
work, rather than judicial systems, to get changes in the implementation of policies.  One 
advocacy organization, for example, partnered with juvenile detention facilities to develop data 
collection and analysis systems for their facilities.  The analyses, in turn, are used to improve 
practices in the facilities to better serve the public and the detainees.  Another advocacy 
organization is a foundation that funds projects to maintain or advance voter accessibility.  The 
projects they fund employ many methods of direct reform, including litigation and education, but 
in all cases they seek to directly impact voter accessibility, rather than indirectly through 
legislative processes.  Their advocacy director explained that they certainly welcome changes to 
public policy resulting from their actions, but they are more focused on implementation reforms 
than policy solutions. 
Popular power strategy. (Factor 4) 
 The popular power strategy had an eigenvalue of 2.23 and explained 10% of the variance 
in the Q-sorts.  Four of the 31 participating organizations were significantly associated with this 
strategy at the 99% confidence level, and an additional one was significantly associated at the 
95% confidence level.   
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 Like the public lobbying strategy, the popular power strategy is also aimed at advancing 
the public’s interests and democratic policy making.  However, its approach is completely 
different.  While the public lobbying strategy focuses its activities on formal policy makers, the 
popular power strategy eschews them (15:-3, 05:-2).  Instead, organizations adopting the popular 
power strategy aim to sway the public’s views in order to change policies (14:+1) and social 
conditions (08:+2), and to build more responsive and democratic systems of policy making 
(21:+2).  They use a variety of methods to influence the public’s views, including coalition 
building (04:+3), public mobilizations (14:+2), media and information campaigns (09:+3), 
framing and messaging (20:+2), and rebutting opposing views (18:0).  
(e)  Coalitions, media work, rebuttals/debate  public views  policy agenda, change  
social/physical conditions 
(f)  Coalitions, media work, rebuttals/debate   responsive policies/democracy 
However, they generally do not engage in research and analysis (23:-3), policy monitoring and 
evaluation (07:-2), or demonstration projects (13:-2), which tend to target narrower audiences.  
Instead, their preferred tactics revolve around affecting broad public demand, rather than direct 
action, in order to initiate policy changes and more responsive policy making systems (14:+1, 
21:+2). 
 For example, one participating organization facilitated a broad campaign on immigration 
policy reforms.  Their executive director explicitly discounted policy change as their direct goal.  
“Others do that,” she said.  Instead, their measures of progress are the numbers of people and 
groups who are advancing the issue.  By building these coalitions, they expect policy to follow.  
“We bring attention to issues… Instead of our audience being policy makers specifically, it’s 
more all the people doing this work, and we say [to them] you should be thinking about this issue 
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and this angle.  Getting people to think in different ways, that is how we influence the debate.”  
She called this kind of work the “infrastructure-building side of advocacy,” focusing more 
directly on participation than policy outcome. 
 How these advocates engage the public in their issues vary widely.  The above 
organization identified key stakeholders and convened meetings of them.  Two other 
organizations created opportunities for the public to gain personal experiences with the issue.  In 
one case, an organization sought to “democratize” local education policy and administration by 
empowering parents to advocate at school districts and school sites.  They trained parents in 
school governance structures and processes, then encouraged them to engage their local schools 
to meet their demands for their children’s education.  Of course, these parents already had stakes 
in the issues (their children), but the organization empowered them to be policy advocates for 
their children within the district and site.  In another case, the public’s stake in the issue had to be 
taught by the advocacy organization.  An environmental group working to raise environmental 
standards of coal-fired power plants needed to convey to the public how such plants affect them 
personally, even if they are far away.  So, in earned media coverage, they invited the public to 
send samples of their hair to a laboratory that would measure the amounts of mercury found in 
them.  (Mercury is a pollutant resulting from coal-fired power generation.)  By revealing the 
personal stakes in the issue, the organization gained broad public support for their cause.  This 
advocacy organization selected this strategy because it utilizes their competitive advantage in the 
policy debate: public support.  “The way you influence public policy is you basically have the 
power of money and you have the power of people,” explained the policy director.  “We are 
never going to match [the opposition’s] money, so we invest heavily on the people side...  We 
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have a grassroots army—boots on the ground—2.3 million members and supporters that are 
joining [us] and committed to working on policy change.”   
 Another method used in these cases to garner public attention and support is through 
protests and what one respondent called “theatric events.”  One advocacy group sought an end to 
the United States’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and while they saw their efforts as part of a 
larger one to change policy on these wars, their direct involvement was much more limited.  
Their objective was simply to draw people’s attention to alternative views of the wars.  They did 
so through “in-your-face theatric events,” ones that would earn media and public attention.  
Indeed the organization’s director of advocacy was trained in theater and she used that 
background to communicate in dramatic forms their organization’s alternative views. 
Institutional partnership strategy. (Factor 5)  
 The institutional partnership strategy had an eigenvalue of 1.84 and explained 9% of the 
variance in the Q-sorts.  Three of the 31 participating organizations were significantly associated 
with this strategy at the 99% confidence level, and an additional three were significantly 
associated at the 95% confidence level.   
 Advocacy organizations employing this strategy view government institutions as central 
to policy making, and they pursue policy changes by collaborating with them (02:+2).  The 
advocates provide policy makers with organized public support (10:+3), research (15:+3), 
messaging (01:+2), and sometimes pilot programs (13:+2) to catalyze the policy makers’ 
support.  These advocates see themselves as partners with the government institutions, not 
adversaries of them.  Indeed, they generally avoid public debates (05:-3, 18:-3), litigation, (17:-2) 
and other confrontational tactics that might deteriorate their relationships with the policy makers.  
They also avoid indirect tactics such as media work (06:0) that they don’t completely control.  
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Because these advocates work primarily with decision makers directly, they view their purpose 
more narrowly focused on specific policy changes, and not more broadly on social changes (08:-
2) or democratic enhancement (11:-2).   
(g)  Coalitions, research, messaging, lobbying  policy makers’ views  policy change 
 A policy director of one of the significantly associated advocacy organizations succinctly 
summarized this strategy’s view of policy change when she said, “There are three places to 
address [policy] issues:  legislators, administration, and the courts.  [We] are involved with all 
three.”  The statement not only identifies the centrality of government institutions in policy 
change, but also the breadth of government institutions this strategy targets.  This particular 
organization’s advocacy efforts focused on issues of criminal justice, and indeed their key 
advocacy activities included producing and summarizing research written for legislators, agency 
administrators, and the courts through amicus curiae briefs.   
 Another organization focuses on a state’s foster care system, and their primary advocacy 
tactic builds relationships and understanding between legislators and the organization’s 
constituents.  They sponsor a shadowing day, in which legislators follow foster youth through 
their experiences in the foster care system.  They also organize a lobbying day, in which foster 
youth meet with every member of the legislature plus the governor and lieutenant governor to 
share their proposals for reforms in the foster care system.  Together, these activities help 
legislators understand how the existing foster care system works and how it could be improved.  
The organization’s policy director explained that some legislators had no prior understanding of 
foster care, relaying how one legislator once asked a foster youth, “What did you do to get 
yourself into foster care?”  The organization recognizes that many policy makers simply are not 
aware of these issues, so educating them in constructive ways, rather than confronting them with 
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adversarial tactics, builds collaborative relationships that can result in policy changes.  In this 
case, their efforts led to the passage of a recent significant reform to the foster care system 
despite concerns of its fiscal impacts on the state budget.   
Indirect pressure strategy. (Factor 6) 
 The indirect pressure strategy had an eigenvalue of 1.52 and explained 8% of the 
variance in the Q-sorts.  Three of the 31 participating organizations were significantly associated 
with this strategy at the 99% confidence level.  Two additional organizations were significantly 
associated at the 95% confidence level. 
 Advocates using this strategy affect policy change by influencing policy makers, but they 
do so indirectly rather than through lobbying or other direct tactics.  They choose to convey 
public opinion (19:+3), use the media (06:+2), and implement pilot programs (13:+2) to apply 
pressure on the policy makers.  These advocates believe that with these pressures, policy makers 
will affect their desired policy changes (22:+2) to improve social and physical conditions 
(08:+3).     
(h)  Public’s views, media, pilot programs  policy makers’ views  policy change  
social/physical conditions 
 While these advocates will use public opinion to sway decision makers, they do not 
directly engage in swaying the public’s opinion (18:-2).  They simply mobilize the public that is 
in support of their efforts.  Therefore, their aim is focused on specific policies and social 
changes, and not generally on reforms of the policy making processes (12:-3, 24:-3, 11:-2).   
 One organization associated with this strategy advocates for urban open spaces.  Their 
policy director explained their rationale for focusing on the public rather than policy makers, 
saying that elected leadership changes frequently while the public’s stakeholders in the issues do 
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not.  So they choose to mobilize the public to be advocates of the issue no matter who is in 
public office.  “Real people... speak louder” than legislators, she explained.  So they 
“...empower, organize people so they know each other, they know their neighborhood,” and can 
effectively advocate for open spaces.  Key to their effort in empowering neighborhood advocates 
is equipping them with data and information to support their preferences and arguments.  “We 
drive our movements with data,” she explained.  “Our advocacy is about lining up... academic 
and data rigor with community relationships, and reinforcing what people feel with actual data.”  
The data “...empower neighborhoods with real tools that speak louder to the [county] supervisors 
when real people are speaking up and sharing [how] they are personally affected.” 
Discussion 
The objective of this study was to empirically identify distinct and coherent policy 
advocacy strategies employed by nonprofit organizations, and interpret their corresponding 
viewpoints on the processes of policy change, something that the professional and academic 
literatures have largely ignored.  The former tends to describe long menus of advocacy activities 
and objectives without linkages to guide their selections by organizations.  The latter has focused 
on specific tactics (e.g., media work, lobbying, coalitions) without considering the larger 
strategies in which they are employed, or the processes of policy change without considering the 
individual advocates in those processes.  This study begins to fill this critical gap by using Q-
methodology to comprehensively reveal six approaches to policy advocacy found among policy 
advocacy nonprofits.  These strategies provide nonprofits some degree of guidance in policy 
advocacy by describing the viewpoints, activities, and goals of each.  It also allows us to lay a 
theoretical foundation under advocates’ existing practices.  Table 5 begins this work by 
summarizing the viewpoints and tactics of these distinct advocacy strategies, and identifying key 
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policy theories with which they appear to be aligned.  It is important to emphasize that the 
strategies’ affinities to theories are our extrapolations of those theories onto the strategies we’ve 
identified among our data.  Most of the cited theories were developed outside this study’s context 
of nonprofit organizations.  Still, our extrapolations are based upon the strategies’ and theories’ 
common views of the processes of policy change, the distribution of power in those processes, 
and decision making processes in policy change.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 The distinguishing tenets of the public lobbying strategy are its focus on direct interaction 
with formal policy makers (e.g., legislators, administrators), and lobbying as its primary mode of 
interaction.  Advocates adopting this strategy see policy making power concentrated in 
autonomous government players, reflecting an institutional view in which policies are outputs of 
formal-legal processes (Cahn, 1995; Selznick 1996).  And while this view can support a variety 
of advocate tactics engaging policy makers, this strategy prefers lobbying through the 
development of congenial relationships.  This tactic aligns strongly with Walker’s (1991) inside 
strategy and Baumgartner et al.’s (2009) study of lobbying.    
 The inside/outside strategy views two separate necessary conditions for policy change: 
and champion on the inside of the policy making body, and demonstrated outside public support 
to apply pressure for change.  While Walker (1991) generally described advocacy organizations 
as adopting either inside or outside strategies, we observed organizations adopting both into this 
coherent and influential approach.  The inside component here, however, is not as general as 
Walker’s.  For his inside strategy, Walker described broad–based lobbying of “political and 
administrative leaders” usually applying leverages including financial resources, substantive 
expertise, and constituency pressure.  In the inside/outside strategy, however, we observed 
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focused lobbying and recruitment of an identified political partner, such as a legislator or 
executive.  Overall, the strategy echoes key aspects of Kingdon’s (1984) streams theory in that 
the window of opportunity for policy change opens with the confluence of multiple factors.  In 
the problem and policy streams, advocacy organizations articulate the social problems needing 
policy intervention and develop proposed solutions to them, providing the evidence and 
arguments supporting them.  In the politics stream, the advocates develop political will among 
decision makers by demonstrating strong public support and pressuring decision makers to act.  
Lastly, advocates identify and support a policy entrepreneur on the inside of the legislature or 
executive branch, who can usher the issue through the decision making process.   While 
Kingdon’s streams identify the conditions necessary for policy change, the inside/outside 
strategy identifies assignments to key players inside and outside the decision making process to 
facilitate policy change.     
 The direct reform strategy includes tactics that use judicial or administrative processes, in 
lieu of legislative processes, to affect specific reforms in policies or administrative practices.  In 
the judicial tactic, advocates in our dataset were plaintiffs or legal counsel to plaintiffs in 
lawsuits or threats of lawsuits.  Their policy preferences are thus directly advanced through 
adversarial legalism (Kagan, 1991, 1999) rather than the more congenial tactics of inside 
strategies.  In the administrative tactic, advocates demonstrate successful reforms on small scales 
to agencies and the public, with the aim of inducing broad-based reform.  In effect, these 
advocates lower the risk of systemic change by demonstrating success on a smaller scale first.  
Their tactic adapts incremental decision making to break-down systemic change into a sequence 
of lower-risk decisions.  While Lindblom (1959) formulated incrementalism as a descriptive 
theory of sub-optimal decision making, advocates take advantage of incrementalism’s low-risk 
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outcomes to promote their proposed changes.  In both tactics, advocates also use the media to 
raise public awareness of their issue and increase political pressure for policy change (Linsky, 
1988).   
 The popular power strategy embodies the stereotypical grassroots approach to policy 
advocacy, and aligns with Walker’s outside strategy (1991) and resource mobilization theory 
(McCarthy & Zald, 2006).  It views legislatures and other government offices not as autonomous 
decision makers, but rather as reactive entities reflecting popular will.  Therefore, advocates 
using this strategy focus on building coalitions and mobilizing the public around its causes.  
Furthermore, by increasing public participation in policy advocacy, these advocates believe they 
are enhancing democratic policy making processes themselves, in addition to affecting specific 
policy changes. The strategy also invokes the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988) in 
two ways.  First, it views coalitions as central actors in policy making, so it devotes significant 
efforts to coalition building.  Second, it recognizes the role of learning in the policy process, so 
information dissemination and media work constitute an integral tactic in this strategy.  
 Advocates employing the institutional partnership strategy view their participation in 
governance as an integral part of producing effective and responsive public policies and services.  
Legislature and agencies left on their own may be well-intentioned but lack the public’s 
perspectives to optimize outcomes.  Therefore, these advocates seek partnerships with 
government institutions do set policies and improve services.  Their viewpoint aligns closely 
with the public participation literature in both policy making (Bryson & Anderson, 2000; Smith 
& Huntsman, 1997) and public services (Roberts, 2008).  However, while these literatures 
espouse public participation for both normative (e.g., enhanced democracy) and descriptive (e.g., 
better outcomes) reasons, the advocates in our data focused on the latter.  Their objectives were 
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limited to reforms of specific policies and services, rather than broader democratic processes.  
This viewpoint also overlaps with the coproduction concept found in the public administration 
literature (Brudney & England, 1983), in which service beneficiaries participate in the delivery 
of public services.  However, in our data some of the advocates employing this strategy were not 
direct beneficiaries of the services they sought.   
 Finally, in the indirect pressure strategy, advocates target the decisions of government 
actors, reflecting an institutional view of policy change (Selznick, 1996). However, they choose 
to influence them indirectly by raising concerns about issues among the public.  Thus, their 
preferred tactics align with the Walker’s “outside” approach (1991), such as public education 
efforts, working with coalitions, and conducting public mobilizations.  Mosely (2011) observed 
that organizations often favor indirect strategies when they appear to lack skill, experience or 
knowledge to use insider tactics such as lobbying, or find the lack of legal clarity around 
permissible levels of lobbying to be confusing.  In our data, however, advocates preferred 
outside tactics as a means of establishing long-term public support to span many short-term 
tenures of elected officials.  From a tactical perspective, the indirect pressure strategy looks a lot 
like the popular power strategy, in that they both mobilize the public and engage the media. 
However, their viewpoints are clearly distinct.  Thus, their theoretical affinities are too.  Indirect 
pressure strategists’ purpose in engaging the public is to affect the decisions of government 
decision makers, recognizing that centrality of power in policy making.  On the other hand, 
popular power strategists engage the public because that is where policy making power primarily 
resides.  The two strategies may look alike in operation, but this difference in viewpoint could 
result in different performance metrics.   
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There are a few limitations of these findings that must be accounted. First, this study only 
examines the strategies employed by nonprofit organizations.  It makes no claims on for-profit 
organizations, which are also heavily engaged in policy advocacy and might reasonably be 
expected to use different tactics and strategies.  Indeed, in this study’s example of a nonprofit 
fighting for stricter standards on power generation, they faced stiff opposition from the coal 
industry which was reported to utilize money in key tactics to defend their permits (e.g., 
purchase media, lobby).  Instead, this study focuses on the specific gap in understanding how 
nonprofits advocate for policy change.   
The second limitation is the range of the sample across issues areas and political 
ideologies.  The original sampling frame was constructed to carefully include organizations 
working in a broader range of issues areas, including those usually associated with either liberal 
or conservative ideologies.  However, those that agreed to participate were more liberal leaning 
in their policy stances, and they tended to cluster around a few issue areas.  For example, table 2 
shows three organizations working in education, and another two in child welfare.  While one of 
these organizations identifies itself with a conservative perspective, three are more clearly on the 
liberal side of the spectrum.  Similarly, multiple gun rights and marriage defense organizations 
consistently declined aggressive recruitment to participate in this study, while those advocating 
for gun controls and marriage equality did participate.  Thus, if politically conservative 
nonprofits, or those in issue areas not represented in this sample, advocate in substantively 
different ways, then their strategies would not be included in this study’s findings.  Still, the six 
resulting strategies reported here do collectively cover all of the categories of tactics identified in 
the professional and academic literatures, so any missing strategies would likely be a different 
combination of tactics, rather than something completely different. 
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Despite these limitations, this study significantly advances our understanding of policy 
advocacy by nonprofit organizations.  Research comparing different strategies of policy 
advocacy had so far largely escaped empirical analysis.  This study begins to fill that gap by 
identifying six distinct strategies that cumulatively explain 61% of the variance the dataset. 
Furthermore, at least five organization loaded onto each of the six factors, suggesting highly 
reliable results that can be extrapolated to the study population (Brown, 1980, p. 67).  For 
nonprofit organizations faced with the quandary of how best to plan policy advocacy efforts, this 
study’s findings offers guidance. The strategies identified in this paper have both theoretical 
backing and empirical evidence of real-world usage.  For the academic community, this study 
begins to bridge the gap between the literatures on policy advocacy organizations and policy 
theories, by describing advocates’ viewpoints on policy processes and linking them to existing 
theories.  
Future research could provide greater clarity around how policy advocacy organizations 
make strategic decisions about activities and feasible outcomes, based on factors such as 
resources, membership, and geographic location.  Building on the findings of this paper, we have 
begun research to explore the use of different tactics and strategies for organizations with 
different profiles.  This next follow-up study involves collection of survey data with a random 
sample of nonprofit organizations engaged in policy advocacy across the United States.   
 While these strategies may be indicative of the types of approaches organizations may 
take, their ultimate success in creating social change will depend on social and political context.  
As Teles & Schmitt (2011) point out, “…tactics that may have worked in one instance are not 
necessarily more likely to succeed in another. What matters is whether advocates can choose the 
tactic appropriate to a particular conflict and adapt to the shifting moves of the opposition” (p. 
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40).  Yet no general would go into battle without studying the successful strategies used in past 
conflicts, so knowing what organizations do to affect change can have great practical 
significance and can add to our emerging understanding of advocacy practice and evaluation. 
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Table 1: Advocacy activities and their theoretical linkages to outcomes 
Activities Theoretical link Outcomes and impacts 
Coalition building; 





1988); Interest group studies 
(Baumgartner & Leech, 1998) 
Changes in public views; 
Changes in decision makers’ 
views; Policy adoption 
Engaging decision makers Institutionalism (Cahn, 1995) 
Elite theory (Mills, 1956; 
Putnam, 1976) 
Changes in decision makers’ 
views; Policy adoption 
Information campaigning: 
research and analysis 
Rational decision making 
(Lindblom & Cohen, 1979; 
Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980) 
Changes in public views; 
Changes in decision makers’ 
views; Policy adoption 
Information campaigning: 
rhetoric (e.g., issue framing, 
labeling, anecdotes, etc.) 
Rhetoric studies (Schneider 
and Ingram, 1993; Nowlin, 
2011; Jones & McBeth, 2010) 
Changes in public views; 
Changes in decision makers’ 
views; Policy adoption 
Information campaigning: 
media work 
Media studies (Nowlin, 2011; 
Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; 
Linsky, 1988) 
Changes in public views; 
Changes in decision makers’ 
views; Sets policy agenda; 
Raises political will to act; 
Hastens action 
Reform efforts: litigation Adversarial legalism (Kagan 
1991, 1999) 
Policy adoption 




Changes in public views; 
Changes in decision makers’ 
views; Policy adoption 
Defensive activities Public dialectic (Majone, 
1989); Policy-oriented 
learning (Sabatier, 1988) 
Changes in public views; 
Changes in decision makers’ 
views 
Policy monitoring Bottom-up implementation 
theories (Hill & Hupe, 2011) 
Changes in bureaucrats’ 
actions 
Policy monitoring Evaluation theory (Nachmias, 
1980) 
Setting the policy agenda 
Information campaigning; 
Engaging, mobilizing public; 
Engaging decision makers 
Multiple streams theory 
(Kingdon, 1984) 
Setting the policy agenda; 
Policy adoption 
Engaging and mobilizing the 
public 
Public participation (Bryson 
& Anderson, 2000; Kastens & 
Newig, 2008; Xu, 2001; 
Kastens & Newig, 2008; 






Table 2: Participating policy advocacy nonprofits 
Organization 
number 
Levels of government 
targeted in advocacy 
case 
Policy issue area of 
advocacy case 
Program expenses 
reported in Guidestar 
(year) 
1 national, state, local environment $133,418 (2009) 
2 national public health $13,267 (2007) 
3 state, local residential care $829,359 (2010) 
4 local child welfare $1,147,295 (2012) 
5 local senior welfare $304,979 (2012) 
6 national, state criminal justice $361,882 (2009) 
7 national, local sustainability $224,064 (2006) 
8 local land conservation $1,955,370 (2010) 
9 local social equity not available 
10 national, state, local civic engagement $1,130,853 (2011) 
11 national, local disabilities $292,235 (2010) 
12 local parks $233,686 (2009) 
13 state, local arts not available 
14 national, state, local land conservation $119,592,234 (2012) 
15 state energy, telecom $3,497,658 (2010) 
16 state, local juvenile justice $1,397,100 (2009) 
17 local pedestrian $60,163 (2011) 
18 national, local war, gun violence $378,475 (2012) 
19 national, state child welfare $3,749,406 (2012) 
20 national, state, local environment $56,641,344 (2012) 
21 national, state, local public health $11,412,991 (2013) 
22 State education not available 
23 state, local education not available 
24 local education $474,429 (2013) 
25 national, state peace and justice $31,211,428 (2011) 
26 national, state criminal justice $2,155,658 (2012) 
27 state, local civil rights $1,636,906 (2013) 
28 State foster youth $1,096,788 (2010) 
29 local environment $3,390,216 (2012) 
30 national, state civil rights $5,594,924 (2011) 





Table 3: Factor loadings matrix with defining sorts 
Org. 
number 
factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 4 factor 5 factor 6 
1 0.1618 0.0313 0.0538 0.3078 0.4323 * 0.5327 ** 
2 -0.0740 0.3882 0.5807 ** 0.0012 0.0056 0.1712  
3 -0.2266 -0.2023 -0.6820 ** -0.2344 -0.0002 -0.2831  
4 0.4558 * 0.2034 0.2061 0.1846 0.1989 0.2759  
5 0.2818 -0.4423 * -0.1680 0.1861 0.4588 * 0.0688  
6 0.1584 0.0578 0.5176 * 0.3411 0.0621 -0.2180  
7 -0.0647 0.1620 0.0400 -0.5820 ** -0.2605 -0.4200  * 
8 0.7361 ** 0.0736 0.1988 -0.3266 0.1596 0.0607  
9 -0.0473 -0.6564 ** 0.4689 * -0.0862 0.1020 -0.2077  
10 -0.0597 -0.0450 0.3397 0.6769 ** 0.2956 0.2758  
11 -0.0781 0.0424 -0.0792 -0.0068 0.0807 -0.4905  * 
12 -0.0420 0.3704 0.1135 0.1918 0.1901 0.5609 ** 
13 0.7104 ** 0.0223 -0.1457 0.1434 -0.1060 -0.1752  
14 0.7634 ** 0.1933 0.1751 0.0713 0.1980 0.1705  
15 0.4491 * 0.2942 -0.0403 0.3808 0.3695 -0.0504  
16 0.1031 0.1424 0.5070 * -0.0626 0.3280 0.5966 ** 
17 0.2873 0.6721 ** 0.0980 0.1532 0.5496 ** 0.1201  
18 0.0662 0.0496 -0.1202 0.8240 ** -0.0390 -0.1154  
19 0.2319 0.6898 ** -0.0260 -0.1609 0.2721 0.2877  
20 0.1579 0.1571 0.3026 0.7163 ** -0.1715 0.3635  
21 0.0208 0.6727 ** 0.0715 0.0545 -0.0956 -0.0650  
22 0.0704 0.5579 ** 0.2832 0.2864 -0.1431 0.3695  
23 0.2940 0.2173 -0.1153 -0.1822 0.5971 ** 0.0596  
24 0.3200 0.1951 -0.0794 0.4048 * 0.0902 0.0722  
25 -0.0757 -0.0354 0.0316 0.0907 0.8151 ** 0.0051  
26 0.5693 ** 0.0558 0.1160 0.2750 0.1823 0.3975  
27 -0.0343 0.0476 0.7948 ** -0.2690 -0.1494 0.1674  
28 0.3396 -0.1123 0.3728 0.1947 0.4520 * 0.1754  
29 0.1419 0.7343 ** 0.2869 0.0711 0.1277 -0.1767  
30 -0.0304 -0.2738 0.3953 0.1088 -0.0065 0.2494  





11% 12% 11% 10% 9% 8% 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01  
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Table 4: Extracted factor arrays for 24 policy advocacy statements 
No. Statement Factor Arrays 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Developing messages, framing issues, labeling and other 
strategies of rhetoric can change policy makers’ views. 
1 3 0 0 2 -1 
2 Lobbying and building relationships with policy makers can 
change their views. 
3 2 0 0 2 1 
3 Monitoring and evaluating existing policy can change how it 
is implemented. 
-2 -1 1 -1 1 1 
4 Building coalitions and networks with like-minded 
organizations and individuals can change the public’s views. 
-1 0 0 3 1 -1 
5 Rebutting opposing views can change policy makers’ views. -2 1 0 -2 -3 -2 
6 Using the media to disseminate information can change 
policy makers’ views. 
1 3 2 1 0 2 
7 Monitoring and evaluating existing policy can set the policy 
agenda. 
-1 -1 1 -2 -1 0 
8 Policies can change social and physical conditions. 3 1 3 2 -2 3 
9 Using the media to disseminate information can change the 
public’s views. 
-1 0 1 3 1 1 
10 Building coalitions and networks with like-minded 
organizations and individuals can change policy makers’ 
views. 
0 2 -2 1 3 0 
11 Policy advocacy in general builds legitimacy in a democracy. 2 -3 -1 0 -2 -2 
12 Policy advocacy in general makes policy making more 
people-centered. 
0 -2 -3 -1 -1 -3 
13 Pilot programs and demonstration projects can lead to policy 
change. 
-1 -2 -1 -2 2 2 
14 Public mobilizations (e.g., protests, letter writing campaigns, 
rallies) can set the policy agenda. 
-2 0 -3 1 -1 0 
15 Research and analyses can change policy makers’ views. 1 1 -1 -3 3 0 
16 Using the media to disseminate information can hasten policy 
change. 
1 2 2 0 0 0 
17 Litigation can change policy. -3 -3 3 -1 -2 -1 
18 Rebutting opposing views can change the public’s views.  -3 -1 -2 0 -3 -2 
19 Changes in the public’s views can change policy makers’ 
views. 
0 0 1 0 0 3 
20 Developing messages, framing issues, labeling and other 
strategies of rhetoric can change the public’s views. 
0 1 2 2 0 1 
21 Public mobilizations (e.g., protests, letter writing campaigns, 
voter registration) can build democracy. 
0 -2 -2 2 0 -1 
22 Changes in policy makers’ views can change policies. 2 0 0 1 1 2 
23 Research and analyses can change the public’s views. 0 0 -1 -3 0 0 
24 Policy advocacy in general produces more effective policies. 2 -1 0 -1 -1 -3 
Variance = 2.833, St. Dev. = 1.683 
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Table 5: Policy advocacy strategies and their affinities to policy theories 
Factor: 
Strategy 
Key tenets Theoretical affinities and extrapolations 
1: Public 
lobbying 
• Viewpoint: advocates see themselves as interpreters 
and champions of public interest 
• Tactics: build relationships with policy makers and 
lobby them, provide political cover 
• Expected outcomes: changes in policy and 
social/physical conditions, people-centered policies 
• Institutionalism (Selznick, 1996): advocates focus on 
the decision making autonomy of legislatures and 
bureaucracies, and the formal processes of policy 
making 
• Baumgartner et al.’s (2009) lobbying, and Walker’s 
(1991) inside strategy: advocates rely on direct 
relationships with decision makers to influence them 
2: Inside/ 
outside 
• Viewpoint: policy change requires a champion inside 
the decision making body, combined with public 
pressure 
• Tactics: lobby and nurture a champion inside the 
decision making body, information dissemination to 
build public support 
• Expected outcomes: policy change 
• Walker’s (1991) inside and outside strategies 
• Kingdon’s (1984) streams theory: advocates advance 
the problem, policy, and politics streams while 
supporting a policy entrepreneur on the inside 
3: Direct 
reform 
• Viewpoint: advocates represent specific interests by 
bypassing legislative processes and focusing on 
judicial and administrative processes 
• Tactics: litigation, monitoring; combined with 
information campaigns to build public support 
• Expected outcome: policy change, changes in 
physical/social conditions 
• Adversarial legalism (Kagan, 1991, 1999): Advocates 
use the courts to advance their arguments and engage 
in political bargaining to reach compromises 
• Incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959): low-risk 
demonstration can lead to systemic change 
• Media work (Linsky, 1988): advocates use media to 
raise public awareness and increase political pressure 
4: Popular 
power 
• Viewpoint: a mobilized public can change policies 
and conditions, and enhance democracy 
• Tactics: building coalitions, public mobilization, 
media work 
• Expected outcomes: policy change, responsive 
policies, enhanced democracy 
• Walker’s (1991) outside strategy: advocates build 
popular support for their cause, expecting policy 
change to follow 
• Resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 
2006): advocates engage in mobilization efforts and 
media work to attempt to gain adherents to their cause. 
• Advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988): 
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coalitions and learning among the policy community 
are central to policy change 
5: Institutional 
partnership 
• Viewpoint: advocates are partners with government 
institutions to reform policies 
• Tactics: coalition building, research, messaging, 
lobbying 
• Expected outcomes: policy change 
• Public participation: advocates partner with 
government to produce more democratic and effective 
policies (Bryson & Anderson, 2000; Smith & 
Huntsman, 1997) and public services (Roberts, 2008). 
6: Indirect 
pressure 
• Viewpoint: policy makers’ views are swayed by 
public’s, so advocates mobilize the public 
• Tactics: public mobilization, media work, pilot 
programs 
• Expected outcomes: changes in policy makers’ views, 
and policy change 
• Institutionalism (Selznick, 1996) and indirect/outside 
tactics (Walker, 1991): advocates focus on the policy 
makers’ power to change policy, but influence them 
indirectly through public pressure. 
 
